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TANYA KATERI HERNANDEZ*

The Construction of Race and Class
Buffers in the Structure of
Immigration Controls and Laws
n the midst of current anti-immigration sentiment,1 which is
motivating dramatic changes in the United States' immigration laws, there exists the myth that prior immigration laws were
more equitable and humanitarian.' Yet historical analysis reveals
that immigration law has been put to uses far from idyllic, and
has always been concerned with the racial makeup of the nation.
* Assistant Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law. I send warm
thanks to all those involved with the Oregon Law Review Symposium Issue (particularly Professor Keith Aoki) who graciously invited me to write this Essay. Rachel
Moran, Michael A. Olivas, and my colleagues Berta E. Hernindez-Truyol and Janice
Villiers provided helpful comments and suggestions on an earlier draft of this Essay.
I extend additional thanks to my fine research assistants Lisa Simone (J.D. 1997)
and Swati Bodas (J.D. 1998), and Nkosi Bradley (J.D. 1999).
1A. M. Rosenthal, Editorial, Dred Scott in San Diego, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1996,
at A27 ("[t]he stinkweed of anti-immigrant prejudice [has spread] across the
country").
2 See, e.g., Peter Rekai, Editorial, Canada's Upscale Influx, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 16,
1996, at A15 (history of U.S. immigration laws based upon the desire for "untutored
ingenuity" of penniless immigrants); Stephen H. Legomsky, E Pluribus Unum: Immigration, Race and Other Deep Divides, 21 So. ILL. U. L.J. 101, 110 (1996) ("Very
few members of the public realize how restrictive our current immigration laws actually are. Only those who fall within a few specific categories are admitted, and then
only if they are not within any of the statutory exclusion grounds.").
3 "Historically, American immigration policy has expressly selected immigrants
and citizens on the basis of national origin and race." Hiroshi Motomura, Whose
Alien Nation?: Two Models of ConstitutionalImmigration Law, 94 MICH. L. REv.
1927, 1933 (1996). See also HARRY H. LAUGHLIN, IMMIGRATION AND CONQUEST 32

(1939) ("If the American people find that they need no more imported human seedstock, they can stop all immigration, or they can set very high immigration standards, so that every future immigrant will constitute a very definite asset by race,
inborn soundness and capacity to the reproductive stocks of the American people."
[The author was a congressionally appointed eugenics expert who was instrumental
in the enactment of the racially restrictive National Origins Quota Act of 1924]).
Some commentators also note that the discourse surrounding immigration reform
reflects "this nation's collective frustration with the problem of race relations in the

[731]
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Specifically, national preoccupation with the maintenance of a
"White country" 4 is reflected in immigration law.5 The continued national preference for White immigrants is explicitly featured in the visa profiling codes of U.S. embassies and
consulates. 6 This Essay employs a race-conscious 7 lens to analyze the way in which immigration law has been structured to
perpetuate a racial hierarchy which privileges Whiteness, primarily by preferring White immigrants to immigrants of color, and
secondarily by drafting immigrants of color to form a middle-tier
buffer 8 and, alternatively, to provide a bottom-tier surplus labor
supply.
My thesis is that the structure of immigration laws9 in the
United States." Kevin R. Johnson, Fear of an "Alien Nation": Race, Immigration,
and Immigrants, 7 STANt. L. & POL'Y REV. 111, 119 (1996).
4 The desire for a "White country" refers to the preoccupation with maintaining
large numbers of White persons in the United States in order to preserve an economic and social hierarchy which privileges whiteness. See generally STEPHANIE M.
WILDMAN,

PRIVILEGE

REVEALED:

How

INVISIBLE

PREFERENCE

UNDERMINES

AMERICA (1996).

5See John A. Scanlan, Immigration Law and the Illusion of Numerical Control, 36
U. MIAMI L. REV. 819, 820 (1982) ("United States immigration law is rooted in the
fundamental premise that the law can and should control the numbers and the characteristics of individuals entering the United States ....") (emphasis added); William R. Tamayo, Asian Americans and the McCarran-Walter Act, in ASIAN
AMERICANS AND CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 337, 341 (Hyung-chan
Kim ed., 1996) ("The use of race or attempts to use race in immigration law are as
American as apple pie.").
6 Olsen v. Albright, No. CIV.A.96-570 (SS), 1997 WL 811966, at *6 (D.D.C. Dec.
22, 1997) (United States' use of race-based profiling codes in embassies' and consulates' visa allocation violates the law).
7 Race-consciousness, as advanced by critical race theorists, emphasizes the explicit recognition of race, and its usage in our society. CRITICAL RACE THEORY:
THE CUT-ING EDGE at xiv (Richard Delgado ed., 1995). See also CRITICAL RACE
THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT (Kimberl6 Crenshaw

et al. eds., 1995).
8 1 use the term middle-tier buffer class to describe the positioning of certain immigrants in the middle of a racial hierarchy which privileges whiteness. The middletier effectively buffers those at the top of the racial hierarchy from the discontented
bottom tier. See, e.g., CARL N. DEGLER, NEITHER BLACK NOR WHITE: SLAVERY
AND RACE RELATIONS IN BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES 226 (1971) (in the con-

text of Brazilian race relations mulattos are a buffer between privileged Whites and
bottom-tiered Blacks).
9 This Essay will focus upon the use of immigration laws to control the flow of
legal immigration, and not the separate but related dynamic of undocumented immigration except as it informs the maintenance of a racial and hierarchical model of
immigration. This is because legal immigration controls not only demonstrate the
disregard for communities of color, but also the governmental preference for White
immigrants. The significance of immigration policy as a form of control over the
"character" of U.S. residents can be fully demonstrated only by examination of gov-
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United States has often facilitated the formation and maintenance of a middle-tier buffer class of residents to preserve racial
hierarchy.1" I utilize the model of the middle-tier buffer to reveal
the use of race in immigration policy and the need for recognition of its strategic deployment in hindering movements for solidarity in opposition to racial hierarchy. This Essay will first
present the origins and purpose of middle-tier buffer classes, and
then review the United States history of race-based nativism in
its preference for White immigrants. This will be followed by an
analysis of historical and present constructions of middle-tier
buffer communities during cyclical national concerns with the
number of White residents. I conclude by observing that this nation's racial hierarchy cannot be dismantled until immigrants of
color take note of the divisive function of middle-tier buffer
formation.
I
THE ORIGINS AND PURPOSE OF MIDDLE-TIER
BUFFERS

Sociologists have developed the concept of "middleman minorities" to describe the structural positioning of various ethnic
minorities into an intermediate status level between a privileged
class and the lowest socioecomic class of residents.1 1 Such structural positioning allows the privileged class to use the intermediate class as a buffer to deflect hostility and as a scapegoat during
times of crisis.12 Middle-tier communities are accorded greater
ernmental preferences and the exclusion of groups. See IAN F. HANEY LOPEZ,
WHITE By LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 1 (1996) (for much of U.S.
history being White was a condition precedent for becoming a naturalized citizen);
JOHN HIGHAM, STRANGERS IN THE LAND 221 (2d ed. 1988) (deportation laws function to purify American society).
10 "Constitutional immigration law must acknowledge that immigration policy
shapes racial and ethnic communities." Motomura, supra note 3, at 1950.
11 HUBERT M. BLALOCK, JR., TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROuP RELATIONS 79 (1967). The middleman minority theory was developed in 1940 to explain

the socio-economic bases of antisemitism. Howard Becker, Constructive Typology
in the Social Sciences, in CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL THEORY 17, 33-35 (Harry E.

Barnes et al. eds., 1940). The theory later evolved to encompass the positioning of
other ethnic minorities, such as Asians, into intermediate buffer classes. Edna
Bonacich, A Theory of Middleman Minorities, 38 AM. Soc. REV. 583, 584 (1973).

12 BLALOCK, supra note 11, at 81; THOMAS SOWELL, MIGRATIONS AND CULTURE:
A WORLD VIEW 34 (1996) ("Often middleman minorities are middlemen not only in
a purely economic sense but also in social and political senses. Where a ruling class
or race collects money from a large class of poorer people whom they do not wish to
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access to economic opportunity than the masses of the lower
class, but at the same time are prevented from entering the privileged class.1 3 Yet middle-tier buffers are inherently fluid in that
demographic and socio-economic changes in a society will motivate either a shift in the groups that comprise the middle-tier or,
in the alternative, motivate an interest in temporarily deactivating the use of a middle-tier buffer. Thus, who is treated as a
middle-tier buffer, and when, is not static but varies with the perceived status stability of the privileged class.
Groups of persons are treated as a middle-tier buffer when a
marked status gap exists between elites and the lower class.14
Immigration often serves to fill status gaps.15 Yet not all immigrants are positioned as middle-tier buffers, which indicates that
there is a factor at work separate from the need to fill a status
gap. Although sociologists have analyzed the ways in which the
culture of being an immigrant has contributed to the dynamic of
a middle-tier buffer, 16 the degree to which immigration laws
themselves have facilitated the construction of middle-tier communities and the ways in which racial thinking underlies such formations has been an open question. The structure of
immigration laws is one of many pull factors17 for immigrants,
but a very forceful one. 18 For instance, although labor demands
influence the flow of immigration, not all countries with similar
economic instabilities are subject to the same U.S. urging for emdeal with directly, middleman minorities may take the role of collecting rents or
feudal dues for the landlords, or taxes for government - all roles virtually guaranteeing unpopularity.").
13 WALTER P. ZENNER, MINORITIES IN THE MIDDLE: A CROSS-CULTURAL ANAL-

Ysis 16 (1991) ("Modern colonial and national governments allow the importation of
labor and control stranger groups through designated leaders. They make laws and
rules preventing them from owning land or entering civil service. They limit eligibility for citizenship and thus may actually facilitate the creation of a class of
sojourners.").
14 Id. at 15 (status gaps exists when "superordinates and subordinate portions of a
society are not bridged by continuous, intermediate degrees of status").
15 Id. at 16.
16 Bonacich, supra note 11, at 585-87.
17 Everett S. Lee, A Theory of Migration, 3 DEMOGRAPHY 47, 50 (1966) (all migration flows correspond both to political and economic "push" factors at the place
of origin and political and economic "pull" factors at the place of destination).
18 Michael J.Greenwood & John M. McDowell, The Supply of Immigrants to the
United States, in THE GATEWAY: U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES 54, 68

(Barry R. Chiswick ed., 1982) (institutional framework of receiving country's immigration laws is an important factor in the number and mix of people who immigrate).
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igration to the United States.19 Instead, the U.S. bias in favor of
White immigrants and the consequent invisibility of persons of
color as recognized citizens of the United States2" influences the
structure of immigration laws.
This Essay will explore the manner in which a privileged White
class' fear of becoming overwhelmed by the demographic increase of ethnic minority populations in a pluralistically diverse
society informs the use of immigration laws for the two-fold purpose of increasing the number of White residents and constructing a middle-tier buffer to preserve the privileges of White
supremacy. Although this Essay focuses on the construction of
middle-tier buffers in the United States, I note that the power of
this model is borne out by its use in other ethnically diverse
countries with a small White privileged class.2 1
II
UNITED STATES' HISTORY OF RACIAL NATIVISM

The impetus for utilizing a middle-tier buffer model of immigration at various points in U.S. history and presently has been
rooted in the White privileged class' concern with maintaining its
status. In fact, the shift in what groups constitute a middle-tier
buffer is triggered by fluctuating concerns with the continued
predominance of White persons as a numerical majority of the
U.S. population. Thus, before examining the operation of middle-tier buffers, this Essay shall set forth the tangible U.S. preference for White immigrants as a mechanism for maintaining a
system of White privilege.
Although a comprehensive federal immigration legal structure
was not instituted until 1875,22 the United States quickly became
19 Silvia Pedraza, Origins and Destinies: Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in
American History, in ORIGINS AND DESTINIES: IMMIGRATION, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 1, 12 (Silvia Pedraza & Rub6n G. Rumbaut eds., 1996) (If the

economic activity in the United States were the only pull for immigration, "immigrants would be equally selected from all nations and all regions at all times. Instead, we find that immigration was (and still is) highly selective .... ").
20

See

PETER BRIMELOW, ALIEN NATION: COMMON SENSE ABOUT AMERICA'S

IMMIGRATION DISASTER 10 (1995) ("[Tjhe American nation has always had a spe-

cific core. And that core has been white ....

). See generally Kenneth L. Karst,

Paths to Belonging: The Constitution and Cultural Identity, 64 N.C. L. REv. 303

(1986) (residents of color in the United States are not viewed as belonging to the
nation of citizens).
21 See infra notes 63-75 and accompanying text.

22 The first federal immigration law, approved in 1875, prohibited foreign convicts
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concerned about the growing racial makeup of the nation. 3
Such preoccupation is evident in congressional debates from
1900 to 1916 surrounding the legal status of residents of two
newly acquired U.S. possessions-Puerto Rico and the Philippines. Although not immigration laws per se, the debates about
status and citizenship were rooted in concerns about the entry of
"others" into the contiguous United States which would be facilitated by granting U.S. citizenship to residents of the two possessions. Such citizenship proposals were often met with skepticism
and concern, and were treated as if they were proposals for direct
immigration of persons from the U.S. possessions. For instance,
during the debates one congressman cautioned Congress against
"open[ing] wide the door by which these negroes and Asiatics
can pour like the locusts of Egypt into this country."2 4 Therefore, decisions regarding citizenship for residents of U.S. territories effect a type of immigration control.
In the congressional debates regarding the citizenship status of
Filipino and Puerto Rican residents, which extended from the
56th Congress through the 64th Congress, the racial makeup of
such populations figured prominently.25 Congress preferred Puand prostitutes from entering the United States. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, § 5, 18
Stat. 477, 477 (repealed 1974). E.P. Hutchinson explains:
The Immigration Act of 1875 marks the beginning of direct federal regulation of immigration. It was only a limited beginning, under the immediate
pressure of concern and moral indignation at the alleged importation of
Chinese prostitutes and European criminals, but began an extension of federal authority that soon was to be developed much further.
E.P. HUTCHINSON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY
1798-1965, at 66 (1981). Later entry was also barred to lunatics, idiots, and persons
likely to become public charges. Act of Aug. 3, 1882, ch. 376, 22 Stat. 214 (act repealed 1966).
23 Kevin Johnson, The New Nativism: Something Old, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue, in IMMIGRANTS OUT! THE NEW NATIVISM AND THE ANTI-IMMIGRANT IMPULSE IN THE UNITED STATES 165, 166 (Juan F. Perea ed., 1997) ("Illustrating the importance of the racial composition of the immigrant stream, the
immigration debate historically has been especially volatile whenever significant
numbers of people of color immigrated to the country from non-Western nations.").
Before the federal government preempted state action in the area of immigration,
states also expressed their preference for White immigrants with state legislation to
encourage the importation of White servants. See, e.g., Mary Sarah Bilder, The
Struggle Over Immigration: Indentured Servants, Slaves, and Articles of Commerce,
61 Mo. L. REV. 743, 768 (1996) ("In 1708, a [Massachusetts] law 'to Encourage the
Importation of White Servants' offered forty shillings a head to each master of a
vessel or merchant who imported male servants between eight and twenty-four years
of age.") (footnotes omitted).
24 33 CONG. REC. 2,172 (1900) (remarks of Rep. Gilbert).
25 See Josr A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: NOTES ON
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erto Rican immigration to the contiguous United States due to
the mistaken perception that Puerto Ricans were primarily
White.26 Furthermore, Congress articulated the sentiment that
"[t]he people of Porto Rico are of our race, they are people who
inherit an old civilization-a civilization which may be fairly
compared to our own."2 7

In contrast, the perceived African attributes of Filipinos rendered them a less desirable supply of immigrants. Filipinos were
denigrated by Congress because they were perceived by Whites
as "physically [sic] weaklings of low stature, with black skin,
closely curling hair, flat noses, thick lips, and large, clumsy feet"
who would not be as beneficial to the nation as the Europeans
who were incorporated as citizens when Louisiana was made a
state.2 8 "How different the case of the Philippine Islands ....
The inhabitants are of wholly different races of people from
ours-Asiatics, Malays, negroes and mixed blood. They have
nothing in common with us and centuries can not assimilate
them .... They can never be clothed with the rights of American
citizenship
"2....
9 When assessing the distinctions between the
Philippine and U.S. populations, it is clear that Congress did not
consider the presence of African-American U.S. citizens, from
whom Filipinos would not be a "wholly different race." Nor did
Congress appreciate the irony of admitting many more persons
of African ancestry into the contiguous United States when Pu-

THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO

Ri-

39 (1979) (noting that the debates were filled with racist rhetoric and
overtones).
26 53 CONG. REC. 7,469 (1916) (Remarks of Rep. Towner: "Nearly three-fourths
of the population are white, mostly of Spanish descent.").
Although Congress was correct in its assumption that some Puerto Ricans are
direct White descendants from Spain, a great number were and are persons with
African ancestry. See generally JALILI SUED BADILLO & ANGEL LOPEZ CANTOS,
PUERTO Rico NEGRO (1986). It is thought that Congress relied upon questionable
census data in its conclusion that Puerto Ricans were primarily White. CABRANES,
supra note 25, at 31. The census data was faulty given the proclivity for Latin Americans to claim whiteness as identity of status regardless of actual African ancestry.
Roberto P. Rodriguez-Morazzani, Beyond the Rainbow: Mapping the Discourse on
Puerto Ricans and "Race", 8 J. OF HUNTER COLLEGE'S EL CENTRO DE ESTUDIOS
PUERTORRIQUEROS 158 (Spring 1996).
27 64 CONG. REC. 8,471 (1916) (remarks of Rep. Huddleston).
28 33 CONG. REC. 3,613 (1900) (remarks of Sen. Bate, quoting report of the Philippine Commission to the President).
29 33 CONG. REC. 2,105 (1900) (remarks of Rep. Spight).
CANS
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erto Rico was extended U.S. citizenship.3"
The preference for White immigrants regardless of skill level is
not exclusive to the United States. Comparison to a Latin American context demonstrates the general role maintenance of racial
boundaries plays in the development and implementation of immigration law. When Argentina sought to industrialize, it constitutionally mandated an increase in the number of European
immigrants to improve the country by "whitening" it.31 The decision to recruit European immigrants was not based primarily
upon any considerations of skill level or wealth, but upon a belief
that the White race was superior to that of the Afro-Argentines
and native peoples who inhabited Argentina up until the twentieth century.3 2 The European immigrants who arrived in Argentina displaced Afro-Argentines from most forms of employment
and social status.3 3
Similarly, the United States recruited European immigrant labor before and after the Civil War to fill a presumed need for
labor, despite the surplus of labor available from newly freed
slaves. 34 European immigrants recruited to the United States
30 Puerto Ricans were accorded U.S. citizenship in 1917. 39 Stat. 951 (1917) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1402 (1994)).
31 Samuel L. Baily, The Adjustment of Italian Immigrants in Buenos Aires and
New York, 1870-1914, 88 AMER. HIST. REV. 281, 298-99 (1983) ("The Argentine
elite viewed the [Italian] immigrants as a means of 'civilizing' the country as well as

developing its economy ....
European immigrants would, they thought, intermix
with the indigenous population and in time help create a biologically superior
population.").
32 GEORGE REID ANDREWS, THE AFRO-ARGENTINES OF BUENOS AIRES, 1800-

1900, 102 (1980) (pseudo-scientific theories about the "innate superiority of the
white race and the inferiority of Africans, Amerindians, and other nonwhite races"
had great influence in Latin America and Argentina in particular). Part of the move
towards progress also involved the campaign to rid the country of its Afro-Argentine population by encouraging miscegenation to lessen the presence of the Black
gene pool and filling the front-line ranks of the military during the wars of 1810-70
with Afro-Argentine men. Id. at 68, 111.
33 Id. at 178, 183. Similar developments have occurred in other Latin American
countries such as Uruguay, Chile, and Paraguay. Id. at 64.
34

JAMES OLIVER HORTON, FREE PEOPLE OF COLOR: INSIDE THE AFRICAN

AMERICAN COMMUNITY 134 (1993) (before and after the Civil War free Blacks in
most of the urban North "faced stiff competition from immigrant workers who generally refused to tolerate [Bilacks as skilled co-workers"); IRA BERLIN, SLAVES
WITHOUT MASTERS: THE FREE NEGRO IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH 231 (1974)
("The influx of Irish and German workers into Southern cities speeded the exclusion
of Negro freemen from many occupations. . . . With white workers available in
growing numbers, white employers exercised their racial preference in many trades
traditionally dominated by blacks."); Pedraza, supra note 19, at 4 (from 1820-1920,
33,654,803 Europeans legally immigrated to the United States and usually consti-
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displaced free Black persons from employment.3 5 The historical

preference for a White workforce in the United States continues
today.36 It is the consistent preference of White employers for
White employees which, in part, accounts for the opposition
some persons of color currently have towards increased immigra-

tion,37 despite the common struggles which immigrant and nonimmigrant persons of color face. As the section that follows
tuted 70% to 96% of all legal immigrants admitted);

MANNING MARABLE,

How

CAPITALISM UNDERDEVELOPED BLACK AMERICA: PROBLEMS IN RACE, POLITICAL

ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 28 (1983) ("[tlhe only period when Black employment approached 100 percent was during slavery").
35 HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 17, 19 (after the Civil War federal and state governments encouraged European immigration as demonstrated by the 1864 Act to Encourage Immigration, Act of July 4, 1864, 13 Stat. 385); Gerald P. L6pez,
Undocumented Mexican Migration:In Search of a Just Immigration Law and Policy,
28 UCLA L. REV. 615, 645 n.158 (1981) ("After the Civil War ... competition
among states for Europeans intensified, and efforts to attract them expanded on a
vast scale. At least 33 states and territorial governments eventually set up immigration bureaus, advertised in European and American foreign-language newspapers,
sent agents to northern and western Europe, and published their brochures, guidebooks, and maps in English, Welsh, German, Dutch, French, Norwegian, and Swedish.") (footnote omitted); KITIY CALAVITA, U.S. IMMIGRATION LAW AND THE
CONTROL OF LABOR: 1820-1924 3 (1984) ("[n]one of these [European] migrations
was truly spontaneous but was triggered and shaped by state policies"). See generally John E. Bodnar, The Impact of the "New Immigration" On the Black Worker:
Steelton, Pennsylvania, 1880-1920, 17 LABOR HISTORY 214 (Spring 1976) (with the
steady increase in European immigration in the early twentieth century African
American workers enjoyed fewer semi-skilled positions and less upward mobility).
36 Norman Matloff, How Immigration Harms Minorities, 124 PUB. INT. 61 (Summer 1996). Matloff writes:
In regions with high immigration levels, low-skilled jobs in hotels, restaurants, airports, and so on-which could be held by African Americans (and
often used to be)-are now typically held by immigrants .... In fact, a
now-famous study by the General Accounting Office found that employers
in Los Angeles had deliberately and systematically fired black janitors and
replaced them with lower-paid immigrants.
Id. at 64.
37 David J. Hellwig, Strangers in Their Own Land Patterns of Black Nativism,
1830-1930, 23 AM. STUD. 85, 90 (Spring 1982) (African American opposition to immigration rooted in experiences of racism in workforce where immigrants are often
preferred and not from nativistic beliefs). Sociologists note that "the more that
members of a particular racial group feel collectively oppressed and unfairly treated
by society, the more likely they are to perceive members of other groups as potential
threats." Lawrence Bobo & Vincent L. Hutchings, Perceptions of Racial Group
Competition: Extending Blumer's Theory of Group Position to a Multiracial Social
Context, 61 AM. Soc. REV. 951, 951 (1996). Yet, it should be noted that African
American opposition to immigration is often overstated by conservatives in their
efforts to denounce immigration in general, as demonstrated by the African American reluctance to join nativistic organizations. Roy BECK, THE CASE AGAINST IMMIGRATION 156-202 (1996); Hellwig, supra, at 93.
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reveals, this preference for Whites became the rule of law with
the enactment of the Immigration Act of 1924.38
III
THE FLUID CONSTRUCTION OF MIDDLE-TIER BUFFER
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES:

1924-1965
The Immigration Act of 1924 restricted immigration on the basis of national origin and set quotas which favored immigrants
from northern and western Europe. This legislation was tied to
the rise of the pseudo-science of eugenics.3 9
During the House hearings on the Act, genetic theories regarding the superiority of White Nordic persons and the inferiority of all others were the prominent arguments for selective
immigration. 0 Representative Robert Allen of West Virginia
stated: "The primary reason for the restriction of the alien
stream, however, is the necessity for purifying and keeping pure
the blood of America."4 A Pennsylvania representative stated:
"[W]e must set up artificial means through legal machinery to
hand pick our immigrants if we are going to prevent rapid deterioration of our citizenship." 4 The Act "hand-picked" immigrants
by establishing a quota for the number of immigrants who could
38 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (1924). The Act is also known as
the National Origins Quota Act. Although the Immigration Act of 1924 contained
the most blatant preference for White immigrants, it was not the most racist immigration legislation in U.S. legal history, given the Asian exclusion policies which
preceded the 1924 Act. The Asian exclusion laws included: the 1881 Immigration
Treaty with China, which provided for the suspension of Chinese immigration whenever it threatened to affect the interests of the United States; the Act of May 6, 1882,
ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882), which precluded the admission of citizenship to Chinese
immigrants, suspended immigration from China for 10 years, and was continually
renewed; the Chinese-exclusion Law of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (1884),
which suspended the immigration of Chinese subjects regardless of their country of
origin; and the Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (1917), which precluded
the admission of immigrants from the "Asiatic barred zone" (the region covered by
South Asia from Arabia to Indo-China and the islands adjacent to Asia and not
possessed by the United States) up until 1943.
39 DANIEL

J.

KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS

96-97 (1985) (noting that

eugenicists were involved in lobbying for the immigration restrictions contained in
the 1924 Act).
40 KENNETH M. LUDMERER, GENETICS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY 105 (1972).
"The dominant attitude in Congress was that one 'race' was better than another; the
great majority of legislators accepted the eugenicists' claim that this was the dictate
of science." Id. at 110.
41 65 CONG. REC. 5,693 (1924).
42 Restriction of Immigration: Hearings Before the House Committee on ImmigraHeinOnline -- 76 Or. L. Rev. 740 1997
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be admitted by race and national origin. The quota was linked to

the number of persons in the United States from a geographic
region at the time of the 1910 U.S. Census. The 1910 Census was
chosen as the barometer rather than the more recent 1920 Census because White Nordics figured more prominently in the 1910
Census. The larger a group's demographic representation in the
1910 Census, the higher the level of its quota for admittance of
immigrants under the Act.
The racist underpinnings of the Act are particularly apparent
in the provision to exclude the descendants of slave immigrants4 3
from admission as quota immigrants or non-quota immigrants.4 4

The country was hardly overrun with such immigrants, as the
slave trade in the United States had been abolished in 1808.
Hence the representation of African immigrants in the 1910 Census would not have triggered a high quota level for entry under

the Act.45 At the time, however, the United States was concerned that the "rapid multiplication of the yellow and brown
races... would soon overwhelm the whole white world."4 6 One

congressman went so far as to state that "the northern European,
and particularly Anglo-Saxons, made this country. . . . It is a
good country. It suits us. And what we assert is that we are not
going to surrender it to somebody else or allow other people, no
tion and Naturalization,68th Cong. 767 (1924) (statement of the Honorable Thomas
W. Phillips, Jr., Representative from Pennsylvania).
43 GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL

LAW

35-37 (1996) (emphasis added). It hardly seems

accurate to categorize the persons forcibly brought to this country for slavery as
immigrants. Yet, it should be noted that the descendants of slaves were often
treated as immigrants when attempting to travel from state to state.
44 Immigration Act of 1924, ch.190, §§ 4, 11(d)(3), 43 Stat. 153, 155, 159 (1924).
To be excluded under the numerical limitation of the Act and not be included in the
list of exempted non-quota immigrants effectively barred any English speaking person of African ancestry from admission. Presumably Spanish speaking persons of
African ancestry could be admitted as non-quota immigrants from the Western
Hemisphere countries of Mexico, Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic and the Canal Zone, but as such were also subject to exclusion under prevailing English literacy
tests. The political reasons for the latter exemption shall be explored infra.
45 "Regulation of the admission of Blacks was accomplished primarily through the
operation of the national origins quota system. That system, almost from its inception, discriminated against Black admissions by excluding descendants of slave immigrants from the United States census population base." Scanlan, supra note 5, at
823 n.12 (citations omitted).
46 HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 149, 272 (White monied men who felt increasingly
socially displaced in a democratic age clung to notions of their own racial
superiority).
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matter what their merits, to make it something different. 4 7
Thus, the preference for White Nordic immigrants was not one
existing in isolation, but a preference borne out of fears of being
overcome by "non-White" 4 8 foreigners who would thus undermine the existing system of White privilege.4 9
While the Act restricted the continued admission of immigrants perceived as non-White (like Southern Europeans), this
was accompanied by the growing tendency to view European immigrants who had assimilated as White.5 ° The Americanization
campaign of the 1910s helped to rid the immigrant "taint" from
those who had previously immigrated to the United States, 5
while the staggered flow of immigration decreased contacts with
"old world" ways to further the assimilation of European
immigrants.
Without providing European immigrants any significant additional economic opportunity, the United States elevated them
into a middle-tier position based on their claim to Whiteness.52
The transformation of European immigrants into White persons
was for the purpose of having them function as a middle-tier
65 CONG. REC. 5,922 (1924) (statement of Colorado Rep. John N. Vaile).
At this period in time the United States viewed Irish, Italian, and Jewish immigrants as non-White. DAVID R. ROEDIGER, TOWARDS THE ABOLITION OF WHITENESS 184 (1994).
49 Racial nativists desired the continued dominance of the Anglo-Saxon over all
newcomers and feared the deterioration of their exalted position by national mixing
with lesser quality persons akin to a Darwin race war. HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 11,
135.
50 NOEL IGNATIEV, HOW THE IRISH BECAME WHITE 76 (1995) (when the Irish
initially immigrated to the U.S. they were consigned "to an intermediate race located socially between black and white" but were later politically transformed into
Whites). See also Richard D. Alba, Italian Americans: A Century of Ethnic Change,
in ORIGINS AND DESTINIES: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 172,
175 (Silvia Pedraza & Rub6n G. Rumbaut eds., 1996) (upon arrival in the United
States the whiteness of Italians was questioned, but after World War 11 the identity
of Italians more surely began to collapse into whiteness).
51 HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 238, 260 (the Americanization Campaign involved
the nationwide movement to transform immigrants with state-sponsored English
and civics classes which some states mandated by law-the transformation being
that of "'fusing these people who come to us from the Old World civilization into...
a real brotherhood among men"'); ROEDIGER, supra note 48, at 187 ("in the process
of Americanizing European immigrants acquired a sense of whiteness and of white
supremacy").
52 DAVID R. ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS 13 (1991) ("[T]he pleasures
of whiteness could function as a 'wage' for white workers .... That is, status and
privileges conferred by race could be used to make up for alienating and exploitative
class relationships ....").
47
48
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buffer against a growing minority community of surplus labor.5 3

After the First World War ended in 1918, those Europeans
who previously had immigrated to the United States were perceived by promoters of industry as union agitators who needed to
be controlled while capitalizing upon their labor,5 4 thus indicating the vulnerability of middle-tier buffers to cyclical waves of
advantage and disfavor. Rather than lobbying for additional Eu-

ropean immigrants who might be "susceptible" to the union agitation of their fellow compatriots and keep the current
immigrants from assimilating, industry magnates lobbied for the
admission of Mexicans and other persons of color to make up a
bottom-tier labor reserve. Accordingly, the 1924 Act treated
Western hemisphere immigrants from such areas as Mexico,
Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, the Canal Zone, and Central and South America as non-quota immigrants and, thus, exempted them from the numerical limitations of the Act.55 As
potential strike breakers, the bottom-tier laborers could serve as
a warning to White workers against demanding better wages and
other work-related improvements.5 6 This utilitarian view of immigrants as bodies to fill a labor force has its roots in immigration law's early assumption that immigrants were articles of
57
commerce.
53 CALAVITA, supra note 35, at 160 (discussing the growing preference for transient labor of color over European immigrants).
54 HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 225.
55 Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, § 4(c), 43 Stat. 153, 155, 162 (exemption from
numerical limitation on admission of Western hemisphere immigrants).
56 According to Frank Morrison, Secretary of the American Federation of Labor,
when the packing houses of Chicago "wanted cheap labor ... they brought it in.
The idea was that they wanted an unlimited supply. They also wanted an extra supply to let their workers know that if they did not want to work under those conditions, [there were] others to take their places." CALAVITA, supra note 35, at 140
(citing U.S. Congress, House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization, 1919a,
at 62).
This subordinated surplus labor supply also included Black migrants from the
South who were recruited into Northern industry in large numbers when European
immigration was suspended during World War I. CALAVITA, supra note 35, at 134
("Blacks migrated and were actively recruited from southern rural areas ... much as
European immigrants had been recruited earlier from the rural areas of Europe.").
In fact, some commentators view African Americans as migrants from the South of
the United States. See generally Nathan Glazer, Blacks and Ethnic Groups: The
Difference, and the Political Difference It Makes, 18 Soc. PROB. 444 (Spring 1971).
57 Bilder, supra note 23, at 747 (Before federal immigration law was viewed as
incident to the plenary power doctrine, it was linked "to an exclusive federal commerce power based on the perception that immigrants were 'articles of

commerce.').
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The labor reserve of brown faces was imported as a class
subordinate to the White workers already employed, so that the
existence of the subordinant class would constrain the status ambitions of the White buffer class. With each class focused on the
other as a threat to their existence, there would be little energy
for challenging the limitations of a stratified society.5 8 Unlike
the European immigrants who had been subject to the Americanization assimilation campaign for transformation into a White
middle-tier buffer, the brown-skinned labor reserve "escape
valve" was never meant to assimilate. 59 The reason racial minorities were not expected to assimilate and were not encouraged to

assimilate was to facilitate their return to their country of origin
the moment a surplus labor supply was no longer advantageous
to the United States.6 ° European immigrants whom the United
States had earlier viewed as non-White were now encouraged to
grasp a White identity which could clothe them with innate superiority over the surplus labor supply.6 1
58 MARABLE, supra note 34, at 45 ("All whites at virtually every job level are the
relative beneficiaries of racism in the labor force: Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Chicanos,
etc., supply the basic 'draftees' in the permanent and semi-permanent reserve army
of labor.").
59 CALAVITA, supra note 35, at 136 ("In an interesting reversal of the Americanization emphasis on assimilation, immigration policy makers did what they could to
ensure that these Mexican migrants remained socially marginal, constituting a labor
reserve only.").
60 Id. at 148, 160 ("The strong point of Mexican [and] Cuban ...immigration was
that, while supplying workers to labor-intensive and seasonal enterprises like agriculture, they returned to their countries-or could be made to return-during recessions or in the off-season.").
This same dynamic was formally replicated in the 1940s when the Bracero program brought in Bahamians, British West Indians and over 4 million Mexicans over
a thirteen year period as temporary agricultural workers. Michael A. Olivas, The
Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law: The Slave Traders
Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 437 (the Bracero program was
a U.S. government contract-labor program whereby immigrants were recruited as
temporary agricultural workers and then returned to their country of origin "until
the crops were ready to be picked again"). Michael Walzer notes that:
They [were] typically an exploited or oppressed class as well, and they
[were] exploited or oppressed at least in part because they [were] disenfranchised, incapable of organizing effectively for self-defense. That is why
[a] government of guest workers looks very much like tyranny. As a group,
they constitute a disenfranchised class.
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 59 (1983).
61 ROEDIGER, THE WAGES OF WHITENESS, supra note 52, at 133-56; W.E.B. Du
Bois, BLACK RECONSTRUCTION IN AMERICA 700 (1935) ("It must be remembered

that the white group of laborers, while they received a low wage, were compensated
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In effect, the Immigration Act of 1924, with its limitation on
most European immigration but exception for Western hemisphere immigration, facilitated the construction of a White European immigrant middle-tier class to buffer the privileged from
demands by a bottom-tier surplus labor supply, and in turn from
demands from the middle-tier class itself. The racial hierarchy
maintained the privilege of the small top-tier based upon a structure of White supremacy.6 2
The use of immigration controls for the construction of middle-tier buffer communities which maintain a racial hierarchy of
privilege is not unique to the United States. In fact, countries as
distinct as Brazil and South Africa have also utilized a middletier buffer model of immigration.6 3 The following comparison to
Brazil and South Africa is made for the purpose of demonstrating how compelling and pervasive the use of immigration controls is in the construction of middle-tier buffers.
For example, after its abolition of slavery in 1888, Brazil systematically imported European immigrants into the southern industrial areas and placed them in positions ranking above the
native African population.' Only during periods of suspended
European immigration caused by both World Wars were AfroBrazilians sought for employment in Brazilian industry.65 Brazil
in part by a sort of public and psychological wage [in that Whites were] given public
deference and titles of courtesy because [they were] white.").
62 HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 145 ("Under these circumstances [of exerting control
over dark-skinned natives of Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Hawaii] the AngloSaxon idea easily associated itself with emotions of White supremacy. In other
words, while welcoming the immigrant population into the Anglo-Saxon fold, imperialists were also linking their ideal of nationality to a consciousness of color.").
63 Similar comparisons can also be made to the immigration of diverse Asian peoples in Uganda and the Chinese in Jamaica and Guyana, among other comparisons.
MICHAEL BANTON, RACIAL AND ETHNIC COMPETITION 172, 193 (1983)
(In
Uganda, for example, "Europeans were recruited to fill the managerial posts, Asians
as supervisors and Africans as unskilled workers.").
64 Roger Bastide, The Development of Race Relations in Brazil, in INDUSTRIALISATION AND RACE RELATIONS: A SYMPosIUM 9, 10 (Guy Hunter ed., 1965) (ex-

plaining that after the abolition of slavery in Brazil, industrial workers "were drawn
almost entirely from among the European immigrants-Italians, Germans, Portuguese and Spaniards"); FLORESTAN FERNANDES, THE NEGRO IN BRAZILIAN SOCI-

ETY 73-74 (Jacqueline D. Skiles et al. trans., 1969) ("Higher and intermediary
positions were out of reach [for Afro-Brazilians], since only members of the [White]
dominant classes and vertically mobile foreigners and Brazilians of foreign descent
could compete for them."). Later in the century, large numbers of Asians immigrated to the industrialized south of Brazil and functioned as a middle-tier buffer.
BANTON, supra note 63, at 187-88.

65 Bastide, supra note 64, at 10-11.
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preferred Afro-Brazilians as a subordinate surplus labor source
because their existence as a threatened replacement for middletier White immigrant workers kept wages down.66 The Brazilian
campaign for European immigrants also functioned as part of its
national movement to "whiten" the nation by importing more
White residents to dilute the numbers of African and Native peoples. 67 Thus Brazil, like the United States, utilized its immigration policy to preserve a system of White privilege.
It should not be surprising that South Africa also used immigration controls to maintain the hierarchy of apartheid. Once
Coloureds began emigrating from South Africa to flee the strictures of apartheid in the 1960s, the South African government
encouraged Europeans to immigrate to the country to increase
the White population. 68 There was an attempt to have the European immigrants act as a middle-tier buffer class by according the
immigrants greater social deference and economic opportunities
than Coloured South African citizens. 69 One South African Coloured has reflected:
They bring these ... Italians and Greeks here who can't begin

to speak any of the languages of the country and treat them
equal. I speak English, Afrikaans, Gamtaal, and a little Xhosa
and have lived here all my life, and I'm not good enough to
ride on the same bus with [them]? Don't talk to me about
apartheid being a way to preserve a culture or nationalism. It
is a way of preserving the white [man]. 7 °
What is particularly interesting about the South African context is the manner in which the European immigrant middle-tier
model was superimposed upon a preexisting buffer class struc66 Id. at 21 ("Until then, the Negro obviously played a basic part in the economic
development of Brazil, but only by forming a simple reserve army which weighed on
the labour market, and by making possible a policy of low wages, which allowed
scanty capital to be invested in factories, instead of being lost in the wages of
workers.").
67 Id. at 17 ("Indeed, the policy of European immigration in the central and
southern States was not just instituted to permit the development of productivity, by
substituting contingents of free workers ... for a mass of slaves [presumed to be]
lacking professional training; it was also designed to submerge the descendants of
Africans into a more prolific white population, and, in the last analysis, to change
the ethnic composition of the population of the country. This, of course, implies the
myth of the superiority of the white race."); FERNANDES, supra note 66, at 59 (the
trend toward lightening the nation's population was particularly evident in Sao
Paulo where between 1890 and 1929 2,316,729 European immigrants were brought).
69

Jim
Id.

70

Id.

68

HOAGLAND, SouTH AFRICA: CIVILIZATIONS IN CONFLICT
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ture of White supremacy. Specifically, the South African
apartheid hierarchy of Whites, Indians, Coloureds, and Blacks
had historically utilized Indians and Coloureds alternatively as a
middle-tier buffer class. 7 ' Yet when the number of Coloureds in
the population dramatically increased and their affluence was
perceived as a threat to the social position of South African
Whites,7 2 the apartheid strictures were more forcefully adminis-

tered against Coloureds, and European immigrants were brought
in as substitutes for displaced Coloureds.7 3 Evidently the same

White elite fears of having their privilege impinged upon by a
large population of non-White "others," which led to Coloureds

functioning as a middle-tier buffer in order to preserve South African White privilege, in turn acted as a catalyst for replacing the
Coloureds as a middle-tier buffer."

Like the United States'

transformation of European immigrants into a "White" buffer
class, the shift in treatment of the South African Coloureds, from
holding favored status to holding disfavored status, demonstrates
the cyclical nature of middle-tier buffer constructions in response
to elite fears of diminished privilege.7 5 The comparison to South
Africa shows that the White fear of being overwhelmed by grow71 Sheila T. Van der Horst, The Effects of Industrialisationon Race Relations in
South Africa, in INDUSTRIALISATION AND RACE RELATIONS: A SYMPOSIUM 122

(Guy Hunter ed., 1965) ("With few exceptions the Europeans comprise the upper
income groups; their average income has been estimated to be five times the average
Indian income, seven times the Coloured, and ten times the African.").
72 The rising affluence of the Coloureds was a concern of the South African government. HOAGLAND, supra note 68, at 113.

73 Jim Hoagland explains:
The 1970 census showed that the Colored population increase was almost
double that of the white. Two million colored produced as many babies as
four million whites in the last ten years. Projections indicate that by the
end of the century there will be as many Coloreds as whites in South Africa, six million each.
HOAGLAND, supra note 68, at 118.
74 VAN DER HORST, supra note 71, at 101-08 (Whites feared that but for apartheid
their survival as the elite group would be unlikely, given the fact that they comprised, at most, 20% of the population).
75 This fluid shifting of persons in the buffer class points to a salient characteristic
of the middle-tier buffer model-the vulnerability of those positioned as a buffer.
The moment the members of the middle-tier pose a threat to the status of the privileged, replacements are sought, and when a crisis of social unrest arises, the middletier is positioned as a scapegoat. Bonacich, supra note 11, at 589 ("The Indian riots
in Durban [South Africa] in 1949, in which Africans attacked Indian stores, homes,
and persons, are an illustration."). The urban violence which erupted in Los Angeles after the Rodney King verdict was issued is yet another example of the vulnerability of middle-tier buffer communities. See discussion infra notes 100-02 and
accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 76 Or. L. Rev. 747 1997

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76, 1997]

ing numbers of non-White residents can be a motivating force in
the structuring of immigration controls.76 Even when the United
States terminated the official use of the national origins immigration selection method of the 1924 Act, it still maintained a buffer
class scheme in its reform of immigration laws.
IV
MAINTAINING

THE CYCLICAL USE OF A MIDDLE-

TIER WITH THE END OF THE NATIONAL
ORIGINS QUOTA SYSTEM:

1965

TO THE PRESENT

With the enactment of the 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 7 7 the United States abolished the national origins quota immigration selection system. In its stead,
Congress created a family preference system which reserved 74%
of admissions for family members of resident U.S. immigrants
regardless of their geographic origin.7 8 Yet this was not as racially neutral as it appeared on the surface. The family preference system most immediately benefited southern and eastern
Europeans who already had a broad base of family members in
the United States who could petition the government for family
unification.7 9 In addition, the family preference system as
drafted adversely affected immigrants from Africa and Asia who
had low rates of emigration to the United States before the legislation was enacted, and thus had a smaller proportion of persons
in the United States who could petition for family reunification. 0
Just as the formal barrier of the national origins quota system
was abolished, the 1965 Act developed other mechanisms to exclude persons of color as immigrants to the United States. Because of congressional concerns about the rapid population
growth of immigrants of color from the Western hemisphere, the
1965 Act established a limit81 on immigration from Mexico,
76 "The [U.S.] colonies encouraged the immigration of white Europeans and British for a variety of reasons-often to provide labor or alter regional racial composition." Bilder, supra note 24, at 773.
77 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (1965) (codi-

fied as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1-1434).
78 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236. sec. 3, § 203(a)(1),-(2),(4),-(5), 79 Stat. 911, 912-13 (1965).
79 David M. Reimers, Recent Immigration Policy: An Analysis, in THE GATEWAY:
U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES 13, 34-35 (Barry R. Chiswick ed., 1982).
80 Id. at 38-42.
81 111 CONG. REC. 24,739, 24,776 (1965).
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Cuba, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and the Canal Zone.
Western-hemisphere immigrants were also required to meet
qualitative requirements and obtain labor certification.8 2 This di-

chotomy in requirements between Western-hemisphere immigrants and most other immigrants suggests that the family
preference system as intended was far from the great race equality measure commentators have characterized it to be.83 In fact,
the Act's proponents did not envision a radical welcoming of diverse cultures as a result of the legislation. Policy-makers predicted that the most significant increase in immigration resulting
from the Act would be from Greece, Italy and Portugal, whereas
they did "not expect that there would be any great influx" from
the Asia-Pacific triangle. 84
Yet the number of immigrants of color did increase for reasons
not anticipated by the 1965 Act legislators." Following the enactment of the law, Congress established a transition period of

three years. For the first time, this provision permitted unused
visas from countries with undersubscribed quotas to be entered
into a visa pool which could be tapped on a first-come firstserved basis by countries with oversubscribed visa quotas. This
flow of additional visas into a visa pool for countries with oversubscribed quotas unintentionally benefitted immigrants of
color.8 6 After enactment of the legislation, Western Europe be82 Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 89-236, sec. 8, § 101(a)(27)(A),
79 Stat. 911, 916 (1965).
83 One commentator suggests that family unification also hinders the entry of immigrants of color in that relatives of permanent resident aliens must enter subject to
annual numerical limitations, whereas immediate relatives of U.S. citizens are not
subject to numerical limitations. Because a large number of immigrants of color are
petitioned for by "resident aliens" and emigrate from countries of high immigration
demand, they are adversely affected by the numerical limitations. "As a result,
spouses and minor children of some permanent resident aliens enter immediately,
while those from countries like Mexico or the Philippines must wait as long as eight
years." John Guendelsberger, Implementing Family Unification Rights in American
Immigration Law: Proposed Amendments, 25 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 253, 253 (1988).
84

Immigration: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. I of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 418-19 (1964) (remarks of Attorney General Robert
Kennedy).
85 From 1951 through 1960, 53% of legal immigrants were European. In 1992, the
percentage of European immigrants slowed to 18%, while 75% of legal immigrants
were from Asia and Latin America. 1992 INS STAT. Y.B. 27-28, table 2.
86 Charles B. Keely, The Immigration Act of 1965, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND
CONGRESS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 529, 538 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1996) ("The

expectation was that applicants from countries of Southern Europe, like Italy and
Greece, would use these visas to clear the backlogs built up over many years. Their
waiting lists were long. It turned out, however, that the waiting lists contained many
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came more economically and politically stable, thereby reducing
87
the incentive for White immigrants to enter the United States.
Furthermore, an unintended consequence of the United States'
foreign policy of communist containment was the increase in immigrants of color, in that many immigrants of color sought refuge
in the United States from communist countries of origin.8" For
example, Cambodians, Laotians, Vietnamese, Cuban, and Nicaraguan immigrants were admitted as political refugees; immigrants from the Dominican Republic entered the United States
in large numbers following the U.S. military intervention of the
Dominican Republic in 1965 to avoid "another Cuba;" and Korean immigrants were admitted in large numbers after the United
States stationed a military presence in South Korea after the Korean War. In short, the United States' foreign policy of communist containment provided a large base of racial minorities in the
United States who could petition for reunification with family
members.
Furthermore, the United States' own racialized perspective of
the nation as one consisting only of White persons skewed its
predictions about the effects of the family preference system.
The two countries with the largest source of immigrants to the
United States after the enactment of the 1965 Act were Mexico
and the Philippines. "In both countries, decades of active agricultural labor recruitment by the United States-of Mexicans to
the Southwest, and Filipinos to plantations in Hawaii and California-preceded the establishment of chain migrations of family
members and eventually of large and self-sustaining migratory
social networks."89 Nor was the United States ever a country of
applicants who had died or who, for various reasons, had changed their minds. The
old backlogs were relatively quickly eliminated and there were still additional visas
in the transitional pool.").
87 Joseph R. Meisenheimer II, How Do Immigrants Fare in the U.S. Labor Market?, 115 U.S. DEP'T. OF LAB. MONTHLY LAB. REV. 3, 13-14 (Dec. 1992).

88 Rub6n G. Rumbaut, Origins and Destinies:Immigration, Race, and Ethnicity in
Contemporary America, in ORIGINS AND DESTINIES: IMMIGRATION, RACE, AND
ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 21, 30-31 (Silvia Pedraza & Rub6n G. Rumbaut eds., 1996).

89 Id. at 28 (these two countries "share the deepest structural linkages with the
United States, including a long history of dependency relationships, external intervention, and (in the case of the Philippines) colonization"). Mexico's structural link
to the United States was particularly strong given the U.S. federal government's
employment of the Bracero Program between 1942 and 1960 which contracted Mexican farm workers as temporary guest workers pursuant to Public Law 45, the Farm
Labor Bill of 1943. Larry C. Morgan & Bruce L. Gardner, Potentialfor a U.S.
Guest-Worker Program in Agriculture: Lessons from the Braceros, in THE GATE-
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purely White residents, given the existence of Native Americans
before the arrival of the Europeans, the coerced importation of
Africans as slaves, the preexisting residence of Mexicans on Mexican land later forcibly claimed as U.S. territories, and the continual migration of diverse peoples throughout time. Thus the
privileged class' image of the United States as peopled almost
solely by White Nordics was defective,90 and left the nation unprepared for the cumulative effect of the family preference system-mass arrival of the brown-skinned residents who were
considered invisible to the conception of what the nation was.
The settlement of the 1965 Act's new arrivals raised the same
cyclical concern regarding the diminished status of Whites in the
face of a growing number of racial minorities that had influenced
the passage of the 1924 National Origins Act.9 ' Rather than welcoming the newest arrivals for full integration into North American society, the membership of middle-tier buffer communities
shifted to constrain these immigrants with stratified access to social, political, and economic opportunities.9 2
One example 93 of the ways in which new arrivals had their
WAY: U.S. IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND POLICIES 363-64 (Barry R. Chiswick ed., 1982).
See also Olivas, supra note 60, at 437 (regarding the details of the Bracero

program).
90 Ruben J. Garcia, Comment, Critical Race Theory and Proposition187: The Racial Politics of Immigration Law, 17 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 118, 122 (1995) (im-

migration law operates under the misconception "that whites were the first to claim
North America" by overlooking the fact that "Native Americans and Mexicans occupied vast portions of North America" before the arrival of White colonizers). See
also A Memorialto Jewish Small-Town Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, July 5, 1997, at 9 (a
study of Russian-Jewish immigration to the small New England communities of the
United States at the turn of the century "explodes the myth that all of these old New
England locations were then populated only by descendants of the Mayflower").
91 See supra notes 39-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 1924 Act.
The fear of becoming a White minority once the cumulative effect of the new arrivals was discovered is borne out by the enactment of successive legislation to increase
the number of European immigrants, and Irish immigrants in particular, such as the
diversity visa provisions of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, Pub.
L. No. 99-603, § 314, 100 Stat. 3359, 3439, and the Immigration And Nationality Act
of 1990 § 203(c) (codified as 8 U.S.C. § 1153(c)). See also 136 CONG. REC. E3118-03
(1990) (remarks of Rep. Donnelly); Reform of Legal Immigration:Hearings on H.R.
5115 and S. 2104 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration,Refugees, and International
Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 269, 542 (1988)
(statements of Thomas J. Flately and Donald Martin); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 100-

1038 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5558.
92 Pedraza, supra note 19, at 16 (immigrants of color have been provided differential access to "economic, political, and educational institutions").
93 Other examples include the occasional middle-tier treatment of West Indian
Blacks in the African American community and White Cubans in the Latin Ameri-
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place in society structured into the middle-tier is the post-1965
treatment of Asian Americans in the United States. 94 The discussion which follows demonstrates that the pervasive "model
minority" 95 discourse regarding the many nationalities of persons
encompassed by the umbrella term Asian Americans is itself a
mechanism for limiting the opportunities afforded to Asian

Americans as a racial minority, while at the same time structurally positioning them as a community presumably dissociated
from other persons of color. 96 This is because the model minority label accords prestige to some groups of persons of color but
not to others, which alienates the groups and prevents them from
forming coalitions against racial bias. Simultaneously, racial bias
operates to limit the opportunities of the labeled model minorities. Thus, to view Asian Americans as a model minority traps
them as a middle-tier buffer regardless of the actual status of individual members of the buffer class.9 7
In order to maintain a hierarchy of privilege, while defusing
can community among others. See, e.g., THOMAS SOWELL, RACE AND ECONOMICS
96-99 (1975) (immigrant Blacks viewed as outperforming African Americans in the
United States); Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Building Bridges-Latinas and
Latinos at the Crossroads:Realities, Rhetoric and Replacement, 25 COL. HUM. RTS.
L. REV. 369, 391-93 (1994). But see Roy Sim6n Bryce-Laporte, New York City and
the New Caribbean Immigration: A Contextual Statement, in CARIBBEAN LIFE IN
NEW YORK CITY: SOCIOCULTURAL DIMENSIONS 54, 63 (Constance R. Sutton & Elsa
M. Chaney eds., 1987) ("The broader socioeconomic status of the U.S.-Caribbean
residents, relative to other American ethnic or immigrant groups has not been
clearly established." (citations omitted)).
94 Asian Americans were not always regarded as a middle-tier buffer, and in fact

were subject to great disfavor during much of U.S. history. William R. Tamayo,
Asian Americans and Present U.S. Immigration Policies: A Legacy of Asian Exclusion, in ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
1105 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992). See generally Jan C. Ting, "Other Than a Chinaman": How U.S. Immigration Law Resulted From and Still Reflects a Policy of Excluding and Restricting Alien Immigration, 4 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 301
(1995).
95 JOE R. FEAGIN, RACIAL AND ETHNIC RELATIONS 344 (3d ed. 1989); Robert S.
Chang, Toward an Asian American Legal Scholarship: Critical Race Theory, PostStructuralism, and Narrative Space, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1243, 1258-65 (1993). See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, Traces of the Master Narrative in the Story of African American/Korean American Conflict: How We Constructed "Los Angeles," 66 S.CAL. L.
REV.
1581 (1993).
96
Neil Gotanda, Asian American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in
ASIAN AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1087,

1088 (Hyung-chan Kim ed., 1992) ("the notion
implied racial context of racial stratification").
97 Bonacich, supra note 11, at 588 ("It should
the group [of middle-tier members] as a whole
poverty-stricken members; often individuals and

of the model minority carries an
be understood that domination by
does not mean that there are no
families do not 'succeed."').
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the potential for coalition building among people of color, Asian
Americans have been positioned as a middle-tier buffer. The
middle-tier positioning was accomplished by providing Asian
Americans with a nominal number of enhanced opportunities for
advancement.9 8 For instance, in the much discussed dominant
positioning of Koreans vis-a-vis African Americans,9 9 Koreans
have been provided with enhanced access to rental properties,
business licenses, and supply of goods-yet have been subject to
discrimination when attempting to move into White dominated
areas. 1°° Such intermediate positioning of Koreans within Black
communities permits Whites to use Koreans as a scapegoat for
discontent because of their enhanced status in and physical proximity to the Black community. 10 1 During the Los Angeles riots
which followed the Rodney King verdict in 1992, businesses of
Korean merchants were subject to arson and looting. Koreans
noted that the White media "intentionally focused on Korean98 The Review of Black Political Economy 1988 Study demonstrated that 90 percent of Asian Americans, Latinos, and Whites who already owned businesses were
able to obtain commercial loans, while African Americans with identical credentials
only had a 66 percent approval rate. Russ Britt & Edmund Sanders, Business Cultures Blacks Say Lending Bias Stymies Efforts, L.A. DAILY NEWS, May 10, 1992, at
B1. The census reports that in 1992 Black-owned firms comprised only 3.6% of all
U.S. firms and contributed 1% to all U.S. sales and receipts, whereas Asian-American owned firms comprised 4.1% of all U.S. firms and contributed 3.1% to all U.S.

sales and receipts.

BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PUB. No.

MB92, 1992 ECONOMIC CENSUS SURVEY OF MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES (1996). The rate of mortgage loan denials to African Americans far exceeds
that for Asian Americans or Whites. Yi-Hsin Chang, Mortgage Denial Rate for

Blacks in '93 Was Double the Level for Whites, Asians, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1994, at
A2 (the denial rate for conventional loans to African Americans was 34%, while the
denial rate for Asian Americans was 14.5%). But see Ikemoto, supra note 95, at
1586 (comparing the social positioning of African Americans vis-a-vis Asian Americans "assumes that the competition must occur among those forced to stand in line,
not between those making the handouts and those subject to those handouts").
99 See, e.g., BILL ONG HING, To

BE

AN

AMERICAN: CULTURAL PLURALISM AND

130 (1997).
100 Pyong Gap Min, The EntrepreneurialAdaptation of Korean Immigrants, in

THE RHETORIC OF ASSIMILATION

ORIGINS AND DESTINIES: IMMIGRATION, RACE AND

ETHNICITY IN AMERICA

302,

309, 313 (Silvia Pedraza & Rub6n G. Rumbaut eds., 1996) (Koreans have been provided enhanced business opportunities in Black communities where Whites have no
interest in providing services directly-but have been discriminated against for any
further advancements).
101 Reginald Leamon Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructingthe Violent Discourse Between Korean and African Americans, 67 S.CAL. L. REV. 15, 111
(1993) ("Monopoly capitalists, fearful of the ghetto tax (crime) and of the increasing
tensions in ghetto markets, prefer middle merchants, subcontractors, or minorityowned distributors. This hierarchy allows affluent whites and monopoly capitalists
to avoid direct confrontation with mass hostility.").
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Black conflicts during the riots in order to divert Blacks' economic frustrations onto Korean merchants."1 °2 This is the same
pattern of hierarchical "buffering" which occurred during the
Durban, South Africa, riots against Indians in 1949,1°3 and during

the Watts riots in Los Angeles against Jewish merchants in 1965,
where subordinated class members channeled their frustrations
about their oppressed status in 10the
form of urban violence
4
against middle-tier class members.
The ways in which the 1965 Act's inadvertent increase in immigrants of color motivated the transformation of Asian Americans
from being a subjugated class into a middle-tier buffer demonstrate the fluidity of the middle-tier construct. The parameters of
middle-tier buffers are inherently fluid, to serve the purpose of
being easily modified to respond to cyclical White fears of becoming a numerical minority with diminished privilege. The cyclical pattern of White fear is characterized by: 1) preferencing
White immigrants to maintain or create a numerical majority of
Whites; 2) positioning non-White immigrants as a middle-tier to
buffer privileged Whites from the discontent of subordinated
classes when White immigrants are not available; and 3) decreasing middle-tier advantages and seeking non-White immigrants as
a bottom-tier supply of surplus labor, while making renewed appeals for White immigrants when the number of middle-tier class
members becomes so large or prosperous that the privileged
class begins to view the middle-tier as a threat to its status rather
than a shield to protect it. This cyclical pattern is evident in the
post-1965 movement to "reform" immigration laws.
The enactment process of the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 ("IRCA") 10 5 reflected undercurrents of the
White fear of becoming a numerical minority, 10 6 as demonstrated
by the following IRCA debate remarks:
The problem western European immigrants face today is
rooted in the most recent immigration reform effort, undertaken in 1965....
102 Min, supra note 100, at 312.
103 Bonacich, supra note 11, at 589.
104 Robinson, supra note 101, at 21.

105 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq. (1986).
106 Lawrence Auster Newsday, Immigration Gives Birth to Unfree America, AT-

May 15, 1991, at A13, A14 (that Whites of European ancestry will be
a minority in the United States by the year 2050 is a concern because the nation's
ability to "preserve and transmit . . . common heritage depends on the continued
existence of a majority population that believes in it").
LANTA CONST.,
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Events of the last 20 years, however, have exacerbated the
problem of discrimination, not eliminated it. No one predicted, in 1965, the massive wave of immigration from
Asia....

As a result of this policy, in effect since 1965, Europeans are
being squeezed out of the immigration mix[,] ... immigrants
from countries that have historically contributed to our immigrant stock.... 7

These remarks regarding the "problem" with European immigration were made during the IRCA debates, despite the fact that a
large proportion of nonpreference visas had already been reserved for Western Europe.' °8 In addition, IRCA's formal
method for containing illegal immigration also functioned to
maintain the hierarchy of a dominant/middle-tier/subordinant
socio-political structure for legal immigrants.
IRCA chose to address the matter of illegal immigration by
imposing sanctions on employers who illegally hired, recruited,
or employed undocumented workers.'0 9 Given the concern for
the potential exacerbation of discrimination against documented
persons who "looked foreign," IRCA also included an anti-dis132 CONG. REc. H10583-01 (1986) (remarks of Rep. Donnelly).
108 Five thousand Western European nonpreference visas were reserved in each
of the fiscal years 1987 and 1988. Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,
Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 314(a), -(b)(1), 100 Stat. 3359, 3439 (1986) ("[t]he Secretary
shall first make such visa numbers available to qualified immigrants who are natives
of foreign states the immigration of whose natives to the United States was adversely affected by the enactment of Public Law 89-236") (emphasis added).
Although the number of immigrants from African countries has always been adversely affected by the enforcement of U.S. immigration laws, their plight did not
receive the same consideration as that of the European immigrants who have always
been encouraged to immigrate. Bill Ong Hing, Immigration Policies: Messages of
Exclusion to African Americans, 37 How. L.J. 237, 242 (1994). The Immigration
Act of 1990 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1153) continued this preferencing of White immigrants by reserving 16,000 of 40,000 visas for natives of Ireland alone, under the
guise of reserving visas for "diversity" reasons. The diversity visa program reserves
visas for immigrants from low admission countries of Western Europe while excluding low admission countries of India, Korea, China, the Philippines, and Taiwan
from participating. Tamayo, supra note 94, at 1121 ("the diversity provisions essentially cater [to] prejudices that hold that there are 'too many Asians and Latinos'
despite what the population statistics say").
109 The discourse which surrounded the enactment of IRCA focused upon the
matter of border crossers from Mexico and Central America although fifty percent
of illegal immigration stems from affluent Europeans who enter the country legally
and choose to overstay their visas. Alfred Del Rey, Jr., Address at St. John's University School of Law (Oct. 2, 1996) (conference entitled The Recent Immigration
Policy and Recent Developments in Congress).
107
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crimination provision which placed civil penalties on employers
using discriminatory employment practices based on national origin or citizenship. 110 Yet this saving measure was faulty by design. When the U.S. General Accounting Office ("GAO")
conducted a legally mandated evaluation of the employer sanctions provision, it found implementation of IRCA directly resulted in a pattern of widespread discrimination against persons
perceived as alien because of their subordinated ethnicity. 111
IRCA also discourages redress for such discrimination by requiring a plaintiff to show a discriminatory intent on the part of the
employer, in addition to providing evidence of the actual discrimination. 12 This legal standard dilutes the effectiveness of the
anti-discrimination provision in that it "provides less protection
to victims of discrimination because it places a heavier burden on
the plaintiff, thus reducing the likelihood of successful litigation."1'13 The effectiveness of IRCA's anti-discrimination principle was further diminished by the congressional delegation of
enforcement of the anti-discrimination provision to the INS an agency which "[h]istorically... had little or no experience in
regulating businesses or employer hiring or firing practices."' 14
Consequently, the GAO study found a causal link between employers' fear of receiving sanctions for employing undocumented
workers and their consequent discrimination against employees
and job applicants whose race, ethnicity, or English language
skills were deemed to be foreign by employers. 1 5 Although
IRCA provided for a possible repeal of the employer sanctions
provision if GAO found a pattern of widespread discrimina1108 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (1994).
111

U.S.

GENERAL ACCOUNTING

OFFICE,

IMMIGRATION

REFORM:

EMPLOYER

38 (1990) [hereinafter "GAO
Report"]. See also Sarah M. Kendall, Comment, America's Minorities are Shown the
"Back Door"... Again: The DiscriminatoryImpact of the Immigration Reform and
Control Act, 18 Hous. J. INT'L L. 899, 933 (1996) (arguing that "discrimination is
SANCTIONS AND THE QUESTION OF DISCRIMINATION

now entrenched within the system"). Furthermore, such discrimination was foreseeable given the discriminatory treatment meted out to resident aliens and U.S. citizens of Mexican ancestry during "Operation Wetback." LAWRENCE H. FUCHS, THE
AMERICAN KALEIDOSCOPE: RACE, ETHNICITY, AND THE CIVIC CULTURE 124, 248
(1990) (in 1954 the U.S. government instituted the "Operation Wetback" movement

of forced repatriation of undocumented and legally contracted Bracero temporary
agricultural workers).
112 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(d)(2),-(g)(2)(A) (1994).
113 Kendall, supra note 111, at 908.
114 Id. at 917.
115

GAO Report, supra note 111, at 38 n.2.
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tion, 116 Congress took no action after GAO issued its indictment
against the discriminatory effect of the employer sanctions
provision.
The benefit of maintaining an ineffective anti-discrimination
immigration policy is the marginalization of the surplus labor
supply.1 17 IRCA essentially authorizes employers to use the possible denial of employment because of employer concerns with
violating the law as a mechanism for keeping all wages down and
discouraging employees from making demands for appropriate
working conditions. Specifically, IRCA places undocumented
persons of color (more likely to be considered foreign than
White immigrants who "look American") and documented workers of color (who are also considered to "look foreign") in the
precarious position of having to feel thankful for employment at
lower wages and sometimes unsafe conditions-thankful because
they easily could be turned down for employment because they
look foreign and have no effective recourse for such discrimination. 1 8 In addition, low income Whites are provided with a
scapegoat for their economic and social discontent.11 9
In short, IRCA uses an ineffective anti-discrimination provision to maintain the existence of a large marginalized population
as a bottom-tier supply of surplus labor. At the same time,
IRCA allows recruitment of more Whites by reserving for them
large numbers of nonpreference visas, and leaves fixed the status
of an Asian-American middle-tier buffer. Therefore, IRCA
functions to shield the privileged from challenge to their systemic
116 See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(K)(2)(A)(i) (1994).
117 Rachel F. Moran, Foreword-Demographyand Distrust: The Latino Challenge
to Civil Rights and Immigration Policy in the 1990s and Beyond, 8 LA RAZA L.J. 1,

19 (1995) ("In contrast to the traditional immigration story, these Latino workers
do not find entering the United States an experience of empowerment and selfactualization ....
They are economically marginal, socially unacknowledged, and
politically excluded.").
A group which can be kept socially and politically marginal is the ideal source of
surplus labor. CALAVITA, supra note 35, at 137; cf Garcia, supra note 90, at 137
("The ability to deny nonwhites full social participation can be conceptualized as a
form of white entitlement. Put another way, many whites assume that they are entitled to nonwhite labor on their terms, and able to deny these same laborers the
rights of full participation in society.").
118 Olivas, supra note 60, at 436 ("Most crucial to the agricultural growers was the
need for a reserve labor pool of workers who could be imported for their work,
displaced when not needed, and kept in subordinate status so they could not afford
to organize collectively or protest their conditions.").
119 Du Bois, BLACK RECONsTRucriON IN AMERICA, supra note 63.
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entitlements.1 2 ° This works because the tripartite racial hierarchy fosters dissension among subordinated group members concerned with their status vis-a-vis one another. The imposed
economic competition among subordinated groups deflects their
attention from the system of privilege and thereby hinders the
formation of coalitions to combat privilege.
A survey of the most recent immigration reform efforts demonstrates the desire for increased marginalization of people of
color as a bottom-tier surplus labor supply to preserve this tripartite racial hierarchy. The following overview of the 1996 immigration legislation is necessarily concise given its recent
enactment. Each of the racialized aspects of the 1996 legislation
noted herein is worthy of its own scholarly investigation. The
scope of this Essay only permits me to briefly note the racial implications of the legislation.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996121 has been touted as being part of welfare reform in
general with respect to its limitations on participation in any
means-tested public benefits program. 122 Yet one of the Act's
more pernicious aspects is its prohibition on adjustment of immigration status for those undocumented persons who were em120 IRCA "has also played a major role in inducing the growth of subcontracting.
Many companies that once employed immigrant workers directly are not willing to
continue doing so because of possible legal repercussions; instead, they use subcontractors." Christian Zlolniski., The Informal Economy in an Advanced Industrialized
Society: Mexican Immigrant Labor in Silicon Valley, 103 YALE L.J. 2305, 2321 (1994)
(subcontracting has led to the expansion of an informal labor market where immigrants are employed under poor working conditions).
Summing up, Zlolniski notes that:
[a]s the result of the restructuring process, janitorial work is an occupation for recent immigrant workers who can be easily replaced in order to
keep labor costs down. Consequently, minority (e.g. Chicano) and immigrant workers who had been living and working in the United States for a
long time have been largely replaced by a new cohort of recent Mexican
immigrants, many of whom are undocumented. The latter, because of their
vulnerable legal position, can be easily exploited by their employers, thus
facilitating the high-turnover strategy.
Id. at 2315 (footnote omitted).
121 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, Title I, §§ 101-34, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
122 See, e.g., Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, §§ 503, 504, 571, 110 Stat. 3009-671, -672, -684 (1996)
(§ 503: ineligibility of aliens not lawfully present for social security benefits; § 504:
procedures for requiring proof of citizenship for federal public benefits; § 571: limitation on use of assisted housing).
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ployed while unauthorized. 1 23 Thus, even though the Act
purports to concern itself with the self-proclaimed problem of
nondocumented persons accessing welfare benefits, it also sanctions employed undocumented persons. The bar against ever altering the immigration status of the very same persons employers
seek to hire effectively treats such residents as guest workers perthereby positionmanently excluded from political participation,
124
class.
bottom-tier
perpetual
a
as
ing them
The Act also makes it a criminal penalty for undocumented
persons to vote in a federal election. 12 5 Extending the sanction
of criminal law to undocumented persons who feel vested
enough in this country to want to vote is more than symbolic of
the sentiment that immigrants perceived as problematic should in
no way consider themselves part of the United States. The recurring theme of subordinated status as fixed is also made clear by
the Act's provisions which allow for state prohibition of drivers
licenses for undocumented persons, 12 6 and which deny eligibility
for post-secondary
educational benefits on the basis of residence
within a state12 7-both of which announce that unwanted un123 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255(c)(8) (West Supp. 1998) ("any alien who was employed
while the alien was an unauthorized alien").
124 WALZER, supra note 60, at 61 ("No democratic state can tolerate the establishment of a fixed status between citizens and foreigner (though there can be stages in
the transition from one of these political identities to the other). Men and women
are either subject to the state's authority, or they are not; and if they are subject,
they must be given a say, and ultimately an equal say, in what the authority does ....
[The alternative is a form of] tyranny.").
125 18 U.S.C.A. § 611 (West Supp. 1998) (proscribing, with some exceptions, any
alien from voting in federal elections). The Act also makes such unlawful voting a
ground for exclusion and deportation. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 347, 110 Stat. 3009-638 (1996).
126 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 502, 110 Stat. 3009-671 (1996) (all states are permitted to conduct a
pilot program in which they deny a drivers license to undocumented persons; the
Attorney General shall submit a report in three years regarding the results of the
pilot programs).
127 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 505, 110 Stat. 3009-672 (1996). See also 42 U.S.C.A. § 1320b7(d)(5)(A) (West Supp. 1997).
The inspiration for this provision emanated from California Proposition 187, approved on Nov. 8, 1994. Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live With Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1633 (1997) ("California moved quickly to achieve its
objectives in Congress. It apparently succeeded; with the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ("IIRAIRA"), the state was able to, in effect, federalize its preferences where those preferences could not be actuated at the
state level."). CAL. EDUC. CODE § 66010.8 (West Supp. 1997) provides for the exclusion of undocumented persons from public post-secondary educational institu-
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documented persons should not try to improve their station beyond that of bottom-tier surplus labor by increasing their
mobility or educational level. The Act's denial of benefits from
unemployment 128 and social security 129 programs (to which undocumented persons have often contributed while working in the
130
United States) also sends a message of marginalization.
The 1996 Act also includes provisions that reflect White immigrant bias in their divergent treatment of White versus nonWhite immigrants. For example, Cubans who arrive in the
United States by airborne transport (and are primarily White13 1 )
are not subject to summary exclusion, 13 2 unlike Afro-Cuban immigrants who arrive by boat, raft, and other non-airborne transport. Yet another example of racially varied treatment of
immigrants is observed in the fact that unlike similarly situated
immigrants of color, Polish immigrants who were not successful
in having their immigration status adjusted in 1995 after being
tions. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48215 (West Supp. 1997) excludes the children of
undocumented persons from public elementary and secondary schools. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 130 (West Supp. 1997) excludes illegal aliens from publicly funded health care except from emergency medical care required by federal
law. Thus California was interested in not only maintaining the subordination of its
undocumented work-force but their children as well.
One commentator convincingly posits that Proposition 187 was "an attempt to
save [California's] racial identity from becoming increasingly nonwhite." Garcia,
supra note 90, at 119. It is perhaps the extremity of Prop. 187's measures that contributed to the injunction against its implementation. The federal court found it to
be an impermissible state scheme to usurp federal authority over immigration matters. See League of United Latin American Citizens v. Wilson, No. 94-7569MRP,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3372, at *1 (D.C. Cal. Mar. 13, 1998).
128 42 U.S.C.A. § 402(y) (West Supp. 1997) (providing that "no monthly benefit
...
shall be payable to any alien in the United States for any month during which
such alien is not lawfully present in the United States").
129 See 8 U.S.C.A. § 1624(a) (West Supp. 1998) (authorizing states to "prohibit or
otherwise limit or restrict the eligibility of aliens ... for programs of general cash
public assistance furnished under the law of the State").
130 Proposition 187 supporter Governor Pete Wilson proposed a large scale guestworker program for Mexican agricultural laborers in California when the Proposition was enacted. Ronald Brownstein, Wilson Proposes U.S. Version of Prop. 187,
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 19, 1994, at Al.
131 Silvia Pedraza, Cuba's Refugees: Manifold Migrations, in ORIGINS AND DESTINIES: IMMIGRATION, RACE AND ETHNICITY IN AMERICA 263, 270-75 (Silvia Pedraza
& Ruben G. Rumbaut eds., 1996) (noting recent phenomenon of Cuban migrants
reverting to desperate means of boat rafts primarily used by Black Cubans).
132 The American Immigration Lawyers Association has noted that implementation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1225 (West Supp. 1998) would not subject Cubans arriving by
airborne transport to summary exclusion. American Immigration Lawyers Association, Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996: Sectionby-Section Summary, at Title III, § 302, in Interpreter Releases (Oct. 7, 1996).
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selected to receive
a visa are again eligible for the 1997 Diversity
133
Visa Lottery.
A more subtle, though no less racially charged provision of the

Act makes female circumcision ("FC") a crime punishable by
five years in prison.134 The criminalization of FC selectively
targets immigrants from certain African countries 13 5 where FC is
practiced for culturally-based reasons. 3 6 In addition to the se-

verity of criminalizing a cultural custom for which greater public
debate is needed, the criminalization also adversely affects both
male and female African immigrants given its intersection with
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.137
The Antiterrorism Act expands the criteria for deportation from
the grave category of crimes of moral turpitude to the more expansive category of crimes for which a sentence of one year or

longer may be imposed, thereby encompassing the custom of
FC.1 38 Finally, the 1996 Act's limitation on class action litigation 1 39 can also be viewed as a provision rooted in White immi133 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 637, 110 Stat. 3009-704 (1996).
134 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 645, 110 Stat. 3009-708 (1996).
Cf. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1374 (a)(1)-(2)
(West Supp. 1997) (providing information may be made available regarding harm
and potential legal consequences of performing female circumcision or allowing children to be subjected to female circumcision).
135 All Things Considered: Seattle Doctors Consider Modified Female Circumcision, National Public Radio Broadcast, Transcript No. 2369-7, Oct. 17, 1996 (most
persons who practice female circumcision, a 6,000 year old procedure, live in East
African countries); Kristin Louise Savell, Wrestling With Contradictions: Human
Rights and Traditional Practices Affecting Women, 41 McGILL L.J. 781, 788 n.25
(1996) (citing EFUA DORKENOO & SCILLA ELWORTHY, FEMALE GENITAL MUTILATION: PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE 11 (1992)) ("[tlhe countries where one or more
forms of [female circumcision] are practised number more than 20 in Africa" along
with Muslim populations in Asia and the Middle East).
136 Although there is presently a debate in the United States regarding the morality and harm of FC, it is occurring within a context which undervalues its cultural
meaning to the African women who practice it. Hope Lewis, Between Irua and "Female Genital Mutilation": Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the CulturalDivide,
8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (1995). In fact, there are a number of African women who
promote the eradication of FC, but do not condone the criminalization of the act.
Id.
137 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
138 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) (West Supp. 1998). The Act also provides
that any final order of deportation against "an alien who is deportable by reason of
having committed a criminal offense . . . shall not be subject to review by any
court"-thereby barring any effective mechanism for challenging the classification
of FC as a basis for deportation. 8 U.S.C.A. § 1105a(10) (West Supp. 1998).
139 8 U.S.C.A. § 1255a(f)(4) (West Supp. 1998) (limiting judicial review of a denial
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grant bias, in that the provision seeks to avoid the kinds of

lawsuits which disempowered immigrants from subordinated
groups have successfully140used to attack discriminatory immigration policies in the past.
CONCLUSION

This examination of the construction of middle-tier buffers

demonstrates that immigration law functions not only as a mechanism for defining our nation's borders, but also to set and reset
fluid racial boundaries 14 1 for the purpose of preserving racial hierarchy. The members of the middle-tier may shift, but the
buffer structure remains to preserve White privilege. Through
the model of the cyclical middle-tier buffer, the current restrictions on immigration can be recognized as a reaction to the
"browning"' 142 of North America as opposed to uniform limitations on all immigration. The current resurgence of nativism 143 is
144
not an objection to all foreigners, just foreigners of color.

The primary lesson to be learned from the long history of middle-tier formations is that middle-tier formations are artificial obstacles that pit the oppressed against one another 14 5 and prevent
to reverse deportation orders to only those persons who filed an application for
adjustment of status within the specified time period, and whose application was
actually refused by an INS officer).
140 For instance, Haitians who as a group were wrongfully refused entry, utilized
class action litigation to address the racial bias which informed the refusal to admit
them to the United States. See generally Janice D. Villiers, Closed Borders, Closed
Ports: The Plight of Haitians Seeking Political Asylum in the United States, 60
BROOK. L. REv. 841 (1994).
141 See generally Ian F. Haney L6pez, The Social Construction of Race: Some Observations on Illusion, Fabrication,and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994)
(explaining the fluidity of racial categories despite their concrete social meanings);
THEODORE

W.

ALLEN, THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE: RACIAL OPPRESSION

(1994) (discussing the transformation of English, Scottish,
Irish, and other European colonists from their various statuses as servants, tenants,
planters, or merchants into a single all-inclusive status of White).
142 Itaberi Njeri, Beyond the Melting Pot: In America, Blending In Was Once The
Ideal But Since Society Has Grown More Diverse Some Say We Must Learn to Respect Our Differences, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1991, at El (noting that demographic
shifts have been labeled by some as the "browning of America").
143 See Rosenthal, supra note 1.
144 HIGHAM, supra note 9, at 9-11 (noting that racial nativism springs from the
Anglo-Saxon traditional desire for continued dominance).
145 Kevin Johnson states:
This sort of stratification obviously differs from the two dimensional Black/
White hegemony. It creates tension and conflict between people of color.
While White society is at the pinnacle of the hierarchy, different minority
AND SOCIAL CONTROL
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successful coordination of solidarity movements.14 6 Immigrants
are useful tools in the construction of middle-tier buffers in that
their status as strangers to the United States diminishes any fixed
expectation about their place in the new society.' 47 Yet it is the

recognition of such positioning by immigrants and citizens of
color which is vital to dismantling racial hierarchy in the United
States. 1 48 An example of effective coalition building which transcended the middle-tier buffer structure is the unification of
Coloureds with Blacks in South Africa in order to overturn
apartheid. 149 Once Coloureds rejected the hierarchy which had
used them as a middle-tier buffer, and Blacks surmounted their
alienation from Coloureds who had been positioned as dominant
to them, 150 the two communities were able to work together towards the dismantling of apartheid. Only when the disaffected
members1 5 ' of this country acknowledge the existence of middletier structures and work towards transcending them will they
groups are left to fight for the remaining piece of the pie. Inter-ethnic conflict, which distracts people of color from the true cause of their problems,
is one result.
Kevin R. Johnson, Racial Restrictions on Naturalization:The Recurring Intersection
of Race and Gender in Immigration and Citizenship Law, 11 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 142, 165 (1996) (book review) (citations omitted). It is this divisive function of
the middle-tier buffer which informs the concern raised about the proposal for a
"multiracial" race category on the decennial census for mixed-race persons. See generally Tanya Kateri Herndndez, "Multiracial"Discourse: Racial Classifications in an
Era
of Color-Blind Jurisprudence,57 MD. L. REV. 97 (1998).
14 6
W.E. BURGHARDT Du Bois, DUSK OF DAwN 117 (Transaction Books 1984)
(1940) ("the real essence of this kinship is its social heritage of slavery; the discrimination and insult; and this heritage binds together not simply the children of Africa,
but extends through yellow Asia and into the South Seas").
147 Bonacich, supra note 11, at 585-87.
148 Norimitsu Onishi, Harlem's Japanese Sister: Immigrants' Daughter Who Embraced Malcolm X Keeps a Radical FlameAlive, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 22, 1996, at 41,47
(Yuri Kochiyama, a long time supporter of Malcolm X, now warns Asian Americans
against falling "for honorary white status, which would effectively dissect one minority group from another.").
149 Charles R. Lawrence III, Foreword: Race, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. L. REV. 819, 827 (1995) (in solidarity against
white supremacy, persons classified as Coloured began to identify themselves as
"black"). See generally ROBERT FATTON, JR., BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS IN SOUTH
AFRICA (1986) (the inclusion of Coloureds within the "black" identity was instrumental in the success of the Black Consciousness movement).
150 Cf Berta Esperanza Herndndez-Truyol, Natives, Newcomers and Nativism: A
Human Rights Model for the Twenty-First Century, 23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1075,
1091 (1996) (even subordinated communities such as African Americans have exhibited nativistic tendencies against immigrants who they view as displacing them).
151 White people can also be disaffected by their socio-economic status while at
the same time benefit from their claim to whiteness. Cf. RICHARD DELGADO, THE

HeinOnline -- 76 Or. L. Rev. 763 1997

OREGON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76, 1997]

start to confront White privilege in immigration law and
152
elsewhere.

COMING RACE WAR?

32 (1996) ("Whiteness is a social construct, basically a readi-

ness to accept many privileges that come to you if you look a certain way.").
152 HARLON

L.

DALTON, RACIAL HEALING

210 (1995) ("We cannot in good con-

science insist that White folk take up the cause of racial justice if we are not equally
willing to struggle with the issues of pecking order and bias among ourselves.").
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